Není to jak řeknete. Osobní jsem přesvědčení že když někoho děla opravdu 'comprehensive test', jak žádal Evropská Rada, závěr by bylo jako jsme viděli v Německo. To je moje důvěru, ale to není naše kritiku na testů. Co tady řekneme je, že současní zátěžové testy ani jsou 'comprehensive' (kompletní, dokonalé) jak bylo žádáno, ani dělala Česká Republika což měla dělat pod testový programu ENSREGa. Stejně SÚJB řekne že vše je v pořádku. Jak můžou lidí jako vy dostat do pravdu když informace okolo jádro je strukturální chybující nebo zkreslené? Odkud přijde v Čechách tu důvěru v lži a polopravdy? A proč kritizujete tady posel? Česká jaderná víra je něco divného...
Dear Mr. Wagner. I have worked through seven of the 15 national reports by now - each report is between 180 and 500 pages, so that takes some time. From those I have read, only the Czech report uses local abbreviations in an English text (the others mostly use the abbreviations as regular in IAEA and WENRA documentation) and only the Czech report misses many accronyms in its table of abbreviations. I mentioned this in my interview with Mr. Patocka, because I see this as a symptom of lack of thoroughness. A report like this - especially when it has to be give for peer-review - needs to be easily accessible. It is a question of attitude.
As example among others, only the Czech report (with only one(!) operator and two locations) uses different methodologies to assess seismic risk for each location.
What I mention in my interview is the strange role of UJV Rez, a majority CEZ owned research institute, that worked on all stages of the stress test as major assessor.
These on the surface marginal issues illustrate that post-Fukushima nuclear safety is not taken sufficiently serious by the operator CEZ, nor by SUJB as regulator.
Concerning the content, I have mentioned some short-fallings, but it is not the engineering detail that is the basis of accidents like Fukushima, it is the failing of the total system - and that failure was in Fukushima based on over-optimism about safety margins, over-trust in technology, too short links between operator and regulator, too little space for critique. Was my main critique on the Slovak stress tests, that they thought too little out of the box, my critique on the Czech tests is that on top of that, it has been done in a sloppy way.
The peer-reviews are supposed to surface such issues. Whether they will, I am not too sure of. It is SUJB's vice president Mr. Krs who organised the peer-review teams, and the Czech team consists of three people that have nothing to win with critical remarks about VVER440/213 reactors, because they judged them themselves in their own country before and already pronounced them pulically "safe", and one of those happens to be Hungary's number 1 nuclear lobbyist.
I have challenged the peer-review teams on 17 January in Brussels to prove me wrong in my scepsis and indeed restore trust in the system by not accepting the sloppyness and minimalist view we see in the Czech stress test report.
Let's wait on those results before anyone declares Czech nuclear power stations in any way "safe".
But given the set-up of the system, I do not hold my breath.
In the end of your last reaction, you quote me saying „That it is slowly incredible how much time you and others are spending reacting on this one blog“. The reason I said that was because I have started to wonder about the intentions behind those reactions.
You write "Pochopitelně jsou mé znalosti tohoto problému založené pouze na těchto materiálech", but that is not all. There is something more on which they are based. And that is the core of this discussion. The core of this discussion and of Mr. Beranek's article is the question of credibility of the system of nuclear oversight in the Czech Republic, and more specifically the role of SUJB, and that in the context of it position in Czech society (independence, role of politics, etc.). You have not only based your opinion on the materials at your disposal, but also on the premise that SUJB is doing a perfect job, that nuclear power oversight in the Czech Republic is sufficient and that critique on it is not acceptable unless it can be proven beyond doubt. From that point of view you have analysed the materials and here and there generalised issues or turned values into facts. That is necessary in human thinking, otherwise we'd all get completely stuck with details - also we from Greenpeace may have given in our reaction on you fast turns, sometimes contradicted one another on the basis of what we remember or what we have heard.
But there is a basic paradigm here that is important. The paradigm of nuclear safety. Fukushima has reminded us once more that with nuclear safety, one cannot err on the wrong side - the price is simply too high. That means that a critical assessment - not a soothing hand - is needed of the system. NGOs have the role of watchdog - even Ms Drabova acknowledges that. You try to falsify the critique without having the full information and the technical means to do so. But in a functioning nuclear safety culture, it is not Greenpeace that needs to prove that everything went wrong, it is the task of Modranska potrubni, Skoda, CEZ and SUJB to prove that indications of wrongdoing with potential risk consequences have not occured. Instead of biting into details of our story (because a blog is a story, not a scientific article on facts) you as a Czech citizen should bite into the inconsistencies of the statements of SUJB and the lacking documentation from Modranska potrubni and Skoda. That is what we have done and still are doing. We have never claimed that the faulty welding repair was made (we never claimed a fact), but that there are credible indications it has been done. These indications have not been overthrown. In contrary, over the last 12 years, the behaviour of SUJB and what happened in the juridical system have only confirmed the impression that there is something to hide. They have not yielded any evidence or proof of the fact that the witness was wrong - his statement is not only still credible, but whenever there are indications that back it up fruther, these are supressed with all the means of political power at the disposal of the regulator and operator of Temelin.
That is the issue at hand. The nuclear regulatory system hides behind the social trust it has, it obfuses the air with reports that are either insufficient or do not even touch the issue at hand (example: Why does Ms Drabova insist that 43/2001/SUJB and prof. Nemec' assessments address 1-4-5 when they clearly don't?). It prevents access to its own findings that there are problems (15/2001/SUJB). The system silences experts that have a critical view, it intimidates witnesses and manipulates the juridical process. And it is supported in this by a society that rather believes the system, because... yes why?
And you follow that line. You turn the facts ("... pan Tutter a... pan Haverkamp zde pisi, ze fyzicke testy svary nesjou podle nich dulezite" - you must be aware after all our discussions that we have never said such a thing - we put them into a wider perspective and said with arguments that they were not *sufficient*). In your further reactions you diffuse attention away from the crucial control of 1-4-5, done by a team of five SUJB inspectors and resulting in inspection report 15/2001/SUJB. Back to my first sentence. Can you imagine why I start to wonder why you put so much time into this? Why do you defend SUJB? What is your interest? Is it nuclear safety (and then you follow a wrong line of reasoning), or is it something else?
For your last question, I refer to the reaction of Mr. Tutter on Mr. Hlavatý on aktualne.cz.
As I pointed out earlier, we do not demand "absolute certainty". We have been told by experts that the measurements on the quality of the welding seam are not sufficient and that for the assessment, one should not only look at the measurements (for the reasons you mentioned), but also to the welding documentation from the time of the welding. The SUJB inspection team that wrote report 15/2001/SUJB did exactly that. That is the reason that it is important that that report becomes public.
Concerning Ing. Hlavatý: I find it difficult to place this. From his description he must have been one of the police people interviewing us on the basis of our trestni oznameni. There were two people interviewed by the police, Mr. Tutter and I. We were both interviewed on the same day in Ceske Budejovice by a two person team that played the good cop bad cop routine in order to get as much as possible information from us. It was interesting but nothing shocking. The police has certainly not shown *me* a drawing on which we should show which weld the witness had indicated. Mr. Tutter did not tell me he had to do this afterwards. I also don't remember anything of the kind in the interview protocolls that I have both (his and mine) seen.
That Mr. Tutter would deny the police contact with the witness was not because he knew everything, but because the witness had made clear he was not prepared to talk with the police from fear for (further) harassment. We have said both so to the police.
Or was Mr. Hlavatý present at our visit of Temelin 2? That I do not exclude, not everyone was introduced there. But that was already in a time that the police was doing the investigation and obviously knew about which weld they were talking and we have also not given the drawing there.
Mr. Hlavatý's description of the further police investigation is precise. The information that Mr. Janovec did his investigation on invitation from CEZ in reaction on our trestni oznameni is new for me. It is interesting to see that SUJB then asked prof. Nemec to continue investigations on the basis of some of the findings of prof. Janovec, but that weld 1-4-5 was not among the welds he investigated.
What surprises me is that Ing. Hlavatý, obviously a policeman, because in Ceske Budejovice there were only police people, then also participated in the parliamentarian seminar. But that is his good right. Sufficient to say here, that Czech (non-green) interpretations of that seminar were different than Austrian and green ones.
What then surprises me - and is for me a warning sign - is that Mr. Hlavatý then accuses Mr. Tutter of lying. Neither me, nor Mr. Tutter, nor Mr. Beranek ever used that word in this discussion. Maybe it is easy to say it in Czech. In English or Dutch or German, it is a heavy moral accusation that you have to back up. Nothing of Mr. Hlavatý describes points at a lie from Mr. Tutter.
Concerning the witness. It is up to him to decide whether he dares to speak out in public or not. We have asked him often, but he is scared. He has been harassed over the years and had to rebuild his life as result. I understand he does not want to risk that. It is something a policeman would understand, which makes me again wonder about the identity of Ing. Hlavatý. Googling did not help me there.
So what should I say about this statement? That it is slowly incredible how much time you and others are spending reacting on this one blog trying to defend SUJB, Modranska potrubni, Skoda, CEZ and Ms Drabova? I don't know what to say. This testimony gives me more questions than answers.
> "V zádném z hodnocených prípadu svarových spoju
> nebyl konstatován nesoulad s pozadavky bezpecnosti
> ani neoprávnený zásah do technologického postupu
> svarování."
See my earlier explanation. As scientist, you need to know you need to read carefully. No problem was *seen*. It does not say that there *is* no problem. That follows exactly what Ing. Tendera explained me - you can only draw a positive conclusion from those tests - that is in case you did find something. If you did not find something, it does not mean that there were no problems, it only means that if they are there, you did not find them with these techniques. These are his words, not mine. They are confirmed by all regulatory experts I spoke with over the last years.
> Zprávu vypracoval tým z nekolika konkrétních známých
> pracovist.
That is not what the problem is. First of all, there is only one concrete person mentioned - Ing Janovec, who wrote the final report in 2007. The other names are of institutions. Secondly, the measurements in the report have been done over the period of six years, which means that the report is not a report of measurements, but a report of reports. It means that we do *not* know on the basis of this summary who exactly did which measurements - also not the measurements in 2001. We have asked for those papers several times and are refused access.
Yes - that is the paper I also already had in my posession because it was on the SUJB website. It does not change what I wrote before.
> Zato Vy mluvíte o anonymním svedkovi, o kterém
> nevím nic.
> O Vasich neznámých odbornících, kterí svar ani nevideli.
Mr. Wagner, I have several times wondered why you put so much time in this discussion. I am still willing to take you on good intentions. That is my basic attitude towards all people I work with - including Ms Drabova, Mr Boehm, Krs, Dobejs and others. But either you read very fast and unprecise or you have a different intent, and that is not finding the truth in this case, but blaiming Greenpeace.
The experts I mentioned are not "neznamy" - they are highly esteemed in their fields. That includes the two SUJB inspectors I have been mentioning and who have explained us a great deal in 2001 when they were still allowed to talk with us.
Furthermore, we have used the foreign experts only to verify whether the story had any credibility before we would forward it to SUJB - not to give a judgement about it being true or not. If you knew how many stories we got around Temelin in those years, you'd be astonished - and only a few of them had merit. And we had only capacity to follow up on a few of those. The credibility needed to be checked every time.
> A nepredkládáte nic konkrétního. Dále mluvíte
> o informacích z druhé ci tretí ruky.
> Ríkáte, ze podle odborníku se dá
> nedestruktivními metodami dokázat jen, ze svar
> byl upravová, ne, ze by nebyl upravován. A proto
> Vám zatímní testy, které úpravy neprokázaly, nestací
> a chcete dalsí. Ovsem i po dalsích, muzete ríci, ze
> zase chcete dalsí a tak do nekonecna?
I thought you were a scientist... in that case you should be able to understand that basic principle. But it is also not the crux of what I have said. That is that our experts, including two that I have named, explained us that the tests done before and in 2001 were not sufficient.
> Já myslím, ze je podstatné, ze bylo
> prokázáno, ze svary jsou v souladu z bezpecností.
> To je dulezité pro bezpecnost elektrárny.
Here it shows you indeed do not work in the nuclear industry. No, in proper safety culture, that is not enough. Besides that, it does not say "v souladu z bezpecnosti", but "v soulady s pozadavky bezpecnosti". It is within safety discussions always the big debate whether the criteria are sufficient or not - and these are only the criteria for these types of measurements, *not* the general criteria (which could - according to the experts I mentioned - not be assessed for using only (only!) these tools). Apart from the fact that the report does not talk about "soulad" but about "ne v nesoulad". And that is a fundamental difference.
The other crucial principle in nuclear safety culture is that you have to prove safety beyond doubt - you are only allowed to err on the safe side. We had and have to deal with too many experts that have sincere doubts about the quality of 1-4-5. In that case, it should be safety that has the priority, not commercial interests. That is where the discussion is about.
I have asked Ms Drabova several times, also in public, to include this issue in the EU stress tests, so that there would be a possibility of international peer review. She has every time refused.
> Ps: Jinak jsem dokoukal na ten inzerovaný
> film a nevím jestli si tím Greenpeace pomohl,
> jak predpokládal pan Beránek.
Helping is a strange word here. This is a documentary made by a a team of independent journalists. We have been interviewed (including me, but those parts were not used for whatever reason) and we have delivered information. The CT team has made their own script and followed their own leads and story-lines. We had no influence on that and could only hope and pray that it would be a fair documentary. I think it was - for Czech circumstances - fair enough to be acceptable. I do have to say, that in Western countries, the tone would have been more critical. I can recommend you documentaries from the French-German broadcaster ARTE.
> Jeho lidé tam moc presvedcive nepusobili (ale
> mozná treba jen na me). Zaznelo tam ale treba
> tvrzení: Francie, kdyz je velká a má hodne odborníku
> muze mít nezávislý dozorový stát a tedy
> treba i jadernou energetiku. Ale Cesko, protoze
> je malé a tím je malá i komunita jaderných odborníku,
> ji mít z principu nesmí, protoze v tak malé komunite
> nemuze udelat nezávislý dozorový orgán. Takze velké
> státy by snad i podle daných zelených aktivistu
> jaderné elektrárny mohly stavet, ale malé, jako
> Cesko urcite ne.
You are reading and watching this with typically Czech glasses... What did happen in the film is that my colleague Jan Rovensky pointed out that in a country like France it is easier to find independent people to do regulatory work, because it is a large country. That in the Czech Republic we have a problem of too close links between the independent regulator (SUJB) and the industry. Mr. Boehm was mentioned as example, and it is a good example that is crucial in this kauza. Mr. Boehm is a former employee of CEZ who worked at Dukovany, then came into the function of inspector and vice-president of SUJB and returned to CEZ. It was Mr. Boehm who refused to have certain questions asked to CEZ in other whistleblower cases that were the reason for our direct action in July 2000, which drew the attention of the whistleblower on the welding case. I think that Mr Boehm played a crucial role in the decision of Ms Drabova to suppress this case.
I do not know whether you have followed what is happening right now in Japan. Japan is a large country, but even there, the links between the regulator and the industry were too short, resulting in a whole line of problems during the Fukushima catastrophe that have played a crucial role in the magnitude of the emissions as well as the response, i.e. concrete people's lives. This is an important lesson from Fukushima.
My colleague Mr. Rovensky mentioned France, because the French regulator ASN clearly shows in its actions and policies that it tries to be independent. It is more rigorous than SUJB in its demands on licensees. It is more transparent than SUJB. It is more pro-active in its communication with the public than SUJB. It is aware that every mistake in transparency and rigorousness in oversight is quality of the system and therefore rightly its credibility.
Mr. Rovensky said that in the Czech Republic we do not see this high level of independence and that we see a lot of revolving door issues. The nationalist swing you give to that is given by you and certainly not by us. As Greenpeace, we have been able to make very clear that neither the Czech Republic nor France is capable of dealing with nuclear energy in a safe way - and, as you probably know, in France that has lead to a bomb attack on our flagship the Rainbow Warrior and to recent hacking scandals into Greenpeace computer systems, etc. We do not discriminate in our critique on the nuclear sector and with good reason.
> To nevím, jak to budou diváci posuzovat. Navíc
> konkrétního tam nikdo z Greenpeace (krome
> obecných frázi o zkorumpovanosti Ceska) nerekl.
> Navíc celá polovina byla o Blahutovicích. A ta
> byla ve stylu, proud potrebuji, ale nic mi
> nestavejte u mé vesnice. Ti lidé by mluvili
> stejne, kdyby jim chteli skácet lesík kvuli
> velké tepelné elektrárne, poli vetrníku, velké
> slunecní nebo prehrade.
I can only say that with that critique, you should address the makers of the documentary. We did a lot more interviews (including with me personally) with them, but the choice of what is used and the story line is theirs, not ours.
Having said that, I appreciated the film for giving an interesting new angle on what indeed has to be called "nuclear religion" in the Czech Republic. I noticed you also looked at the discussion under Mr. Beranek's blog in aktualne.cz, and you will agree with me that the level of discourse in this to me so dear country is abominable. And it is not "the greens" that make it of such a low level.
Fukušima na Moravě? Mohl by stačit stoletý sníh
Jakub Patočka
Jan Haverkamp: Česká zpráva o zátěžových testech jaderek je nekvalitní
Jakub Patočka
As example among others, only the Czech report (with only one(!) operator and two locations) uses different methodologies to assess seismic risk for each location.
What I mention in my interview is the strange role of UJV Rez, a majority CEZ owned research institute, that worked on all stages of the stress test as major assessor.
These on the surface marginal issues illustrate that post-Fukushima nuclear safety is not taken sufficiently serious by the operator CEZ, nor by SUJB as regulator.
Concerning the content, I have mentioned some short-fallings, but it is not the engineering detail that is the basis of accidents like Fukushima, it is the failing of the total system - and that failure was in Fukushima based on over-optimism about safety margins, over-trust in technology, too short links between operator and regulator, too little space for critique. Was my main critique on the Slovak stress tests, that they thought too little out of the box, my critique on the Czech tests is that on top of that, it has been done in a sloppy way.
The peer-reviews are supposed to surface such issues. Whether they will, I am not too sure of. It is SUJB's vice president Mr. Krs who organised the peer-review teams, and the Czech team consists of three people that have nothing to win with critical remarks about VVER440/213 reactors, because they judged them themselves in their own country before and already pronounced them pulically "safe", and one of those happens to be Hungary's number 1 nuclear lobbyist.
I have challenged the peer-review teams on 17 January in Brussels to prove me wrong in my scepsis and indeed restore trust in the system by not accepting the sloppyness and minimalist view we see in the Czech stress test report.
Let's wait on those results before anyone declares Czech nuclear power stations in any way "safe".
But given the set-up of the system, I do not hold my breath.
Šlendrián a zametání pod koberec ve Fukušimě jako v Temelíně
Jan Beránek
In the end of your last reaction, you quote me saying „That it is slowly incredible how much time you and others are spending reacting on this one blog“. The reason I said that was because I have started to wonder about the intentions behind those reactions.
You write "Pochopitelně jsou mé znalosti tohoto problému založené pouze na těchto materiálech", but that is not all. There is something more on which they are based. And that is the core of this discussion. The core of this discussion and of Mr. Beranek's article is the question of credibility of the system of nuclear oversight in the Czech Republic, and more specifically the role of SUJB, and that in the context of it position in Czech society (independence, role of politics, etc.). You have not only based your opinion on the materials at your disposal, but also on the premise that SUJB is doing a perfect job, that nuclear power oversight in the Czech Republic is sufficient and that critique on it is not acceptable unless it can be proven beyond doubt. From that point of view you have analysed the materials and here and there generalised issues or turned values into facts. That is necessary in human thinking, otherwise we'd all get completely stuck with details - also we from Greenpeace may have given in our reaction on you fast turns, sometimes contradicted one another on the basis of what we remember or what we have heard.
But there is a basic paradigm here that is important. The paradigm of nuclear safety. Fukushima has reminded us once more that with nuclear safety, one cannot err on the wrong side - the price is simply too high. That means that a critical assessment - not a soothing hand - is needed of the system. NGOs have the role of watchdog - even Ms Drabova acknowledges that. You try to falsify the critique without having the full information and the technical means to do so. But in a functioning nuclear safety culture, it is not Greenpeace that needs to prove that everything went wrong, it is the task of Modranska potrubni, Skoda, CEZ and SUJB to prove that indications of wrongdoing with potential risk consequences have not occured. Instead of biting into details of our story (because a blog is a story, not a scientific article on facts) you as a Czech citizen should bite into the inconsistencies of the statements of SUJB and the lacking documentation from Modranska potrubni and Skoda. That is what we have done and still are doing. We have never claimed that the faulty welding repair was made (we never claimed a fact), but that there are credible indications it has been done. These indications have not been overthrown. In contrary, over the last 12 years, the behaviour of SUJB and what happened in the juridical system have only confirmed the impression that there is something to hide. They have not yielded any evidence or proof of the fact that the witness was wrong - his statement is not only still credible, but whenever there are indications that back it up fruther, these are supressed with all the means of political power at the disposal of the regulator and operator of Temelin.
That is the issue at hand. The nuclear regulatory system hides behind the social trust it has, it obfuses the air with reports that are either insufficient or do not even touch the issue at hand (example: Why does Ms Drabova insist that 43/2001/SUJB and prof. Nemec' assessments address 1-4-5 when they clearly don't?). It prevents access to its own findings that there are problems (15/2001/SUJB). The system silences experts that have a critical view, it intimidates witnesses and manipulates the juridical process. And it is supported in this by a society that rather believes the system, because... yes why?
And you follow that line. You turn the facts ("... pan Tutter a... pan Haverkamp zde pisi, ze fyzicke testy svary nesjou podle nich dulezite" - you must be aware after all our discussions that we have never said such a thing - we put them into a wider perspective and said with arguments that they were not *sufficient*). In your further reactions you diffuse attention away from the crucial control of 1-4-5, done by a team of five SUJB inspectors and resulting in inspection report 15/2001/SUJB. Back to my first sentence. Can you imagine why I start to wonder why you put so much time into this? Why do you defend SUJB? What is your interest? Is it nuclear safety (and then you follow a wrong line of reasoning), or is it something else?
For your last question, I refer to the reaction of Mr. Tutter on Mr. Hlavatý on aktualne.cz.
With regards and respect,
Jan Haverkamp
As I pointed out earlier, we do not demand "absolute certainty". We have been told by experts that the measurements on the quality of the welding seam are not sufficient and that for the assessment, one should not only look at the measurements (for the reasons you mentioned), but also to the welding documentation from the time of the welding. The SUJB inspection team that wrote report 15/2001/SUJB did exactly that. That is the reason that it is important that that report becomes public.
Concerning Ing. Hlavatý: I find it difficult to place this. From his description he must have been one of the police people interviewing us on the basis of our trestni oznameni. There were two people interviewed by the police, Mr. Tutter and I. We were both interviewed on the same day in Ceske Budejovice by a two person team that played the good cop bad cop routine in order to get as much as possible information from us. It was interesting but nothing shocking. The police has certainly not shown *me* a drawing on which we should show which weld the witness had indicated. Mr. Tutter did not tell me he had to do this afterwards. I also don't remember anything of the kind in the interview protocolls that I have both (his and mine) seen.
That Mr. Tutter would deny the police contact with the witness was not because he knew everything, but because the witness had made clear he was not prepared to talk with the police from fear for (further) harassment. We have said both so to the police.
Or was Mr. Hlavatý present at our visit of Temelin 2? That I do not exclude, not everyone was introduced there. But that was already in a time that the police was doing the investigation and obviously knew about which weld they were talking and we have also not given the drawing there.
Mr. Hlavatý's description of the further police investigation is precise. The information that Mr. Janovec did his investigation on invitation from CEZ in reaction on our trestni oznameni is new for me. It is interesting to see that SUJB then asked prof. Nemec to continue investigations on the basis of some of the findings of prof. Janovec, but that weld 1-4-5 was not among the welds he investigated.
What surprises me is that Ing. Hlavatý, obviously a policeman, because in Ceske Budejovice there were only police people, then also participated in the parliamentarian seminar. But that is his good right. Sufficient to say here, that Czech (non-green) interpretations of that seminar were different than Austrian and green ones.
What then surprises me - and is for me a warning sign - is that Mr. Hlavatý then accuses Mr. Tutter of lying. Neither me, nor Mr. Tutter, nor Mr. Beranek ever used that word in this discussion. Maybe it is easy to say it in Czech. In English or Dutch or German, it is a heavy moral accusation that you have to back up. Nothing of Mr. Hlavatý describes points at a lie from Mr. Tutter.
Concerning the witness. It is up to him to decide whether he dares to speak out in public or not. We have asked him often, but he is scared. He has been harassed over the years and had to rebuild his life as result. I understand he does not want to risk that. It is something a policeman would understand, which makes me again wonder about the identity of Ing. Hlavatý. Googling did not help me there.
So what should I say about this statement? That it is slowly incredible how much time you and others are spending reacting on this one blog trying to defend SUJB, Modranska potrubni, Skoda, CEZ and Ms Drabova? I don't know what to say. This testimony gives me more questions than answers.
With regards,
Jan Haverkamp
> "V zádném z hodnocených prípadu svarových spoju
> nebyl konstatován nesoulad s pozadavky bezpecnosti
> ani neoprávnený zásah do technologického postupu
> svarování."
See my earlier explanation. As scientist, you need to know you need to read carefully. No problem was *seen*. It does not say that there *is* no problem. That follows exactly what Ing. Tendera explained me - you can only draw a positive conclusion from those tests - that is in case you did find something. If you did not find something, it does not mean that there were no problems, it only means that if they are there, you did not find them with these techniques. These are his words, not mine. They are confirmed by all regulatory experts I spoke with over the last years.
> Zprávu vypracoval tým z nekolika konkrétních známých
> pracovist.
That is not what the problem is. First of all, there is only one concrete person mentioned - Ing Janovec, who wrote the final report in 2007. The other names are of institutions. Secondly, the measurements in the report have been done over the period of six years, which means that the report is not a report of measurements, but a report of reports. It means that we do *not* know on the basis of this summary who exactly did which measurements - also not the measurements in 2001. We have asked for those papers several times and are refused access.
> http://www.sujb.cz/docs/technika.pdf
Yes - that is the paper I also already had in my posession because it was on the SUJB website. It does not change what I wrote before.
> Zato Vy mluvíte o anonymním svedkovi, o kterém
> nevím nic.
> O Vasich neznámých odbornících, kterí svar ani nevideli.
Mr. Wagner, I have several times wondered why you put so much time in this discussion. I am still willing to take you on good intentions. That is my basic attitude towards all people I work with - including Ms Drabova, Mr Boehm, Krs, Dobejs and others. But either you read very fast and unprecise or you have a different intent, and that is not finding the truth in this case, but blaiming Greenpeace.
The experts I mentioned are not "neznamy" - they are highly esteemed in their fields. That includes the two SUJB inspectors I have been mentioning and who have explained us a great deal in 2001 when they were still allowed to talk with us.
Furthermore, we have used the foreign experts only to verify whether the story had any credibility before we would forward it to SUJB - not to give a judgement about it being true or not. If you knew how many stories we got around Temelin in those years, you'd be astonished - and only a few of them had merit. And we had only capacity to follow up on a few of those. The credibility needed to be checked every time.
> A nepredkládáte nic konkrétního. Dále mluvíte
> o informacích z druhé ci tretí ruky.
> Ríkáte, ze podle odborníku se dá
> nedestruktivními metodami dokázat jen, ze svar
> byl upravová, ne, ze by nebyl upravován. A proto
> Vám zatímní testy, které úpravy neprokázaly, nestací
> a chcete dalsí. Ovsem i po dalsích, muzete ríci, ze
> zase chcete dalsí a tak do nekonecna?
I thought you were a scientist... in that case you should be able to understand that basic principle. But it is also not the crux of what I have said. That is that our experts, including two that I have named, explained us that the tests done before and in 2001 were not sufficient.
> Já myslím, ze je podstatné, ze bylo
> prokázáno, ze svary jsou v souladu z bezpecností.
> To je dulezité pro bezpecnost elektrárny.
Here it shows you indeed do not work in the nuclear industry. No, in proper safety culture, that is not enough. Besides that, it does not say "v souladu z bezpecnosti", but "v soulady s pozadavky bezpecnosti". It is within safety discussions always the big debate whether the criteria are sufficient or not - and these are only the criteria for these types of measurements, *not* the general criteria (which could - according to the experts I mentioned - not be assessed for using only (only!) these tools). Apart from the fact that the report does not talk about "soulad" but about "ne v nesoulad". And that is a fundamental difference.
The other crucial principle in nuclear safety culture is that you have to prove safety beyond doubt - you are only allowed to err on the safe side. We had and have to deal with too many experts that have sincere doubts about the quality of 1-4-5. In that case, it should be safety that has the priority, not commercial interests. That is where the discussion is about.
I have asked Ms Drabova several times, also in public, to include this issue in the EU stress tests, so that there would be a possibility of international peer review. She has every time refused.
> Ps: Jinak jsem dokoukal na ten inzerovaný
> film a nevím jestli si tím Greenpeace pomohl,
> jak predpokládal pan Beránek.
Helping is a strange word here. This is a documentary made by a a team of independent journalists. We have been interviewed (including me, but those parts were not used for whatever reason) and we have delivered information. The CT team has made their own script and followed their own leads and story-lines. We had no influence on that and could only hope and pray that it would be a fair documentary. I think it was - for Czech circumstances - fair enough to be acceptable. I do have to say, that in Western countries, the tone would have been more critical. I can recommend you documentaries from the French-German broadcaster ARTE.
> Jeho lidé tam moc presvedcive nepusobili (ale
> mozná treba jen na me). Zaznelo tam ale treba
> tvrzení: Francie, kdyz je velká a má hodne odborníku
> muze mít nezávislý dozorový stát a tedy
> treba i jadernou energetiku. Ale Cesko, protoze
> je malé a tím je malá i komunita jaderných odborníku,
> ji mít z principu nesmí, protoze v tak malé komunite
> nemuze udelat nezávislý dozorový orgán. Takze velké
> státy by snad i podle daných zelených aktivistu
> jaderné elektrárny mohly stavet, ale malé, jako
> Cesko urcite ne.
You are reading and watching this with typically Czech glasses... What did happen in the film is that my colleague Jan Rovensky pointed out that in a country like France it is easier to find independent people to do regulatory work, because it is a large country. That in the Czech Republic we have a problem of too close links between the independent regulator (SUJB) and the industry. Mr. Boehm was mentioned as example, and it is a good example that is crucial in this kauza. Mr. Boehm is a former employee of CEZ who worked at Dukovany, then came into the function of inspector and vice-president of SUJB and returned to CEZ. It was Mr. Boehm who refused to have certain questions asked to CEZ in other whistleblower cases that were the reason for our direct action in July 2000, which drew the attention of the whistleblower on the welding case. I think that Mr Boehm played a crucial role in the decision of Ms Drabova to suppress this case.
I do not know whether you have followed what is happening right now in Japan. Japan is a large country, but even there, the links between the regulator and the industry were too short, resulting in a whole line of problems during the Fukushima catastrophe that have played a crucial role in the magnitude of the emissions as well as the response, i.e. concrete people's lives. This is an important lesson from Fukushima.
My colleague Mr. Rovensky mentioned France, because the French regulator ASN clearly shows in its actions and policies that it tries to be independent. It is more rigorous than SUJB in its demands on licensees. It is more transparent than SUJB. It is more pro-active in its communication with the public than SUJB. It is aware that every mistake in transparency and rigorousness in oversight is quality of the system and therefore rightly its credibility.
Mr. Rovensky said that in the Czech Republic we do not see this high level of independence and that we see a lot of revolving door issues. The nationalist swing you give to that is given by you and certainly not by us. As Greenpeace, we have been able to make very clear that neither the Czech Republic nor France is capable of dealing with nuclear energy in a safe way - and, as you probably know, in France that has lead to a bomb attack on our flagship the Rainbow Warrior and to recent hacking scandals into Greenpeace computer systems, etc. We do not discriminate in our critique on the nuclear sector and with good reason.
> To nevím, jak to budou diváci posuzovat. Navíc
> konkrétního tam nikdo z Greenpeace (krome
> obecných frázi o zkorumpovanosti Ceska) nerekl.
> Navíc celá polovina byla o Blahutovicích. A ta
> byla ve stylu, proud potrebuji, ale nic mi
> nestavejte u mé vesnice. Ti lidé by mluvili
> stejne, kdyby jim chteli skácet lesík kvuli
> velké tepelné elektrárne, poli vetrníku, velké
> slunecní nebo prehrade.
I can only say that with that critique, you should address the makers of the documentary. We did a lot more interviews (including with me personally) with them, but the choice of what is used and the story line is theirs, not ours.
Having said that, I appreciated the film for giving an interesting new angle on what indeed has to be called "nuclear religion" in the Czech Republic. I noticed you also looked at the discussion under Mr. Beranek's blog in aktualne.cz, and you will agree with me that the level of discourse in this to me so dear country is abominable. And it is not "the greens" that make it of such a low level.
With regards,
Jan Haverkamp